Call: 1-877-697-2926

What internet access currently works in Iran (June 2025)?

What Internet Access Currently Works in Iran

Iran’s digital landscape operates under one of the most tightly controlled regimes in the world. The government imposes extensive restrictions on online content, monitors user activity, and regularly disrupts connectivity across the country. Despite having over 80 million citizens—many of whom are young, educated, and digitally engaged—Iran ranks among the lowest for internet freedom according to Freedom House’s 2022 report.

For Homo sapiens, the internet has evolved into a lifeline—connecting communities, enabling commerce, advancing education, and amplifying marginalized voices. Nowhere does this become more evident than in societies experiencing political unrest, where access to online networks fuels real-time updates, global solidarity, and grassroots mobilization. Iran’s recent waves of protest have underscored this dependency; with each rise in civil dissent, internet blocks and throttling follow swiftly, suppressing movement coordination and silencing dissent.

But it’s not just political crackdowns that impede connectivity. Surveillance infrastructure, pervasive censorship policies, and global sanctions that restrict access to foreign platforms and services all drive Iranians to seek alternative, often obfuscated, forms of connection. This piece unpacks what internet options remain accessible inside Iran under these constraints—and how people stay online when conventional methods fail.

Internet Censorship in Iran: A Government-Controlled Gateway

Legal and Political Infrastructure Supporting Censorship

The Iranian government operates a centralized censorship regime built on a dense web of legislation, executive control, and security oversight. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC), created in 2012, oversees all internet policy. Chaired by the president but under the direct influence of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the SCC determines what content is acceptable online. In practice, the authority rests with the judiciary, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.

Iran’s Computer Crimes Law passed in 2009 outlines vague offenses such as “disseminating lies” or “disturbing public minds,” giving security agencies wide latitude to restrict online speech. By criminalizing digital dissent and empowering law enforcement to surveil and prosecute internet users, this framework ensures almost all online activity is monitored, filtered, or punishable when deemed inappropriate.

Platforms and Services Commonly Blocked

The Iranian internet landscape is dominated by state-imposed blocks on foreign platforms. Major social media and communication tools are inaccessible through standard internet connections without circumvention tools. Currently, access to the following services is blocked or severely restricted:

Search engines, app stores, and messaging services with strong encryption also face partial or complete filtering depending on state policy, geopolitical tension, and internal unrest.

Filtering Technology and Deep Packet Inspection

Iranian ISPs implement multi-layered content filtering enforced by state-level infrastructure. Domain Name System (DNS) tampering is widespread, with requests to banned websites redirected or timed out. However, the backbone of Iran’s censorship strategy relies on Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), a technology that examines the content of internet traffic in real time.

With DPI, censors can block entire applications, disrupt VPNs by identifying their signature traffic patterns, and throttle encrypted services. Commercial DPI solutions—believed to be acquired from countries including China—enable Iranian authorities to perform both static filtering and dynamic content disruption. More advanced implementations allow targeting by protocol type, port number, and even specific keywords within unencrypted traffic streams.

This granular control mechanism means the government can not only disable a specific website but can also disrupt connections based on behavior patterns. Attempts to access popular encrypted platforms like Signal or ProtonMail without obfuscation often trigger immediate connection terminations.

Deliberate Internet Blackouts as a Tool of Control

High-Profile Protest Blackouts: The November 2019 Case

In November 2019, the Iranian government executed one of the most comprehensive internet shutdowns recorded in the country’s history. Sparked by nationwide protests over sudden fuel price hikes, authorities disconnected Iran from the global internet for over five days. According to the NGO NetBlocks, connectivity levels dropped to just 5% of ordinary levels, effectively cutting off nearly 80 million people from nearly all external online content and services.

This blackout did not occur gradually. Routing decisions by state-run infrastructure companies like the Telecommunication Infrastructure Company (TIC) de-peered international transit points in a matter of hours. While the domestic network—SHOMA—remained active, access to global platforms, from WhatsApp to Google, collapsed almost entirely.

Nationwide and Regional Throttling During Civil Unrest

Beyond complete blackouts, internet throttling has become a standard tactic deployed by Iranian authorities to restrict real-time information flow during politically sensitive moments. Throttling selectively limits bandwidth, disrupting image and video uploads while allowing minimal access to text-based platforms. NetBlocks recorded a major throttling event in September 2022 during the Mahsa Amini protests, where mobile and fixed-line internet speeds dropped by more than 75% in multiple provinces.

These operations are often localized at first—targeting specific provinces such as Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchestan—but expand rapidly when protests escalate. The throttling typically affects foreign-hosted services and tools reliant on encrypted transmission protocols, leaving only state-approved networks minimally functional.

Impact on Access to Global Services and Economic Platforms

The consequences of these shutdowns ripple far beyond the political sphere. E-commerce platforms, payment gateways, and foreign exchange services become inaccessible during blackouts. For example, during the 2019 shutdown, Iranian online retailers saw transaction failures surge by over 90%, according to the Iranian E-Commerce Union. Cross-border freelancers lost access to payment accounts on platforms like PayPal and Upwork. Banking transactions relying on global service architectures faltered.

Startups operating within Iran’s burgeoning tech scene reported complete service collapses. Additionally, educational platforms, from Coursera to Google Scholar, became unreachable, halting online courses and research access for thousands of students. The targeting of these access points illustrates the shutdowns’ broader intent—not merely to suppress protest coordination, but to exert psychological and economic pressure on potential dissenters.

Inside SHOMA: Iran’s National Internet and Its Limits

Centralized Control: The Objectives Behind SHOMA

Launched in phases beginning in the mid-2010s, the National Information Network (SHOMA) represents Iran's strategic effort to establish digital sovereignty. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace, supervised by the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), spearheaded its development. Government officials presented SHOMA as a pathway to boost domestic digital infrastructure, secure sensitive communications, and reduce reliance on international bandwidth. In practice, it offers the state full jurisdiction over traffic flow, digital content, and data storage within national borders.

By routing internet activity through servers located inside Iran, SHOMA enables authorities to create a “walled garden”—networked but disconnected from the global web. The Iranian Parliament, Majlis, has consistently backed budgets for this network, citing security and cultural integrity. This infrastructure also allows the state to continue delivering essential digital services during moments of intentional international internet cutoff, such as during social unrest or protests.

Capabilities and Shortcomings of the Platform

SHOMA supports a range of services including domestic banking, government portals, health systems, and e-commerce sites. It can operate independently of the global internet, which ensures continuous service for institutions tied into the national framework. Network speed within SHOMA often exceeds that of the global internet in Iran, primarily because of proximity and bandwidth prioritization.

However, the platform has key limitations. The lack of international routing restricts access to open-source tools, cloud computing platforms, and global collaboration environments. Developers within Iran encounter barriers when accessing essential updates from infrastructure providers such as GitHub or AWS, unless these entities host mirrored versions accessible through SHOMA. Academic and research institutions experience similar constraints due to limited access to journals or scientific databases unavailable on Iran’s national network.

What Services Are Available Within the National Network?

Despite efforts to incentivize use, adoption outside critical services remains modest. Many Iranians still rely on the global internet for social interaction, technical support, and access to uncensored news. SHOMA’s voluntary adoption rate in households remains low, as it does not fulfill the informational or expressive needs of a population used to global content and applications.

VPN Usage in Iran: A Popular Technique with Limitations

Widely Used VPN Services and Platforms

Despite an extensive framework of digital censorship, millions in Iran routinely turn to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to bypass government-imposed content restrictions. Popular choices include Outline, Psiphon, Lantern, and commercial services like ExpressVPN, NordVPN, and ProtonVPN. While paid services often offer more stability and advanced tunneling protocols, free alternatives remain widely circulated due to their accessibility.

Android platforms dominate usage since the majority of users access the internet via mobile devices. VPN sideloading via direct APK file sharing—through Bluetooth, flash drives, or offline mobile sharing apps—has become commonplace alongside Telegram channels dedicated to distributing updated configurations and installation packages.

Crackdowns and Detection Techniques

Iran’s cyber authorities deploy a layered approach to detecting and blocking VPN traffic. The most prominent tool is Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), capable of identifying unique VPN protocol fingerprints such as OpenVPN, IKEv2, or even traffic obfuscated through SSL or TLS protocols. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace mandates that ISPs maintain real-time analysis capabilities, which has led to the routine blocking of IP addresses and domains associated with known tunneling endpoints.

Authorities also implement targeted throttling of encrypted traffic to render VPN usage practically ineffective without outright blocking it. This hybrid strategy avoids drawing international attention while subtly limiting access. During periods of unrest, the government escalates these tactics by rolling out widespread VPN bans, redirecting queries meant for VPN servers, and even deploying servers to mimic legitimate VPN endpoints and intercept usage data.

The Cat-and-Mouse Cycle

Every clampdown sparks a corresponding wave of innovation. Users collaborate informally and through private channels to distribute newly minted VPN configurations, often relying on international volunteers, GitHub repositories, and cryptocurrency-funded proxy infrastructure. Developers of VPN services respond by modifying server ports, adding cloaking capabilities like obfs4 or Shadowsocks, and migrating servers to new IP blocks.

This reactive-adaptive cycle repeats constantly. Governments block; users circumvent. Known servers fall; new nodes rise. A VPN might work well for a few weeks, only to become useless overnight. The only certainty: the fight for uncensored access in Iran will not stabilize as long as both sides continue investing in smarter tools and detection methods.

What tactics have worked for you or those you know? Observations from inside the network help shape resistance strategies faster than external guesses.

Tor and Anonymous Networks: Cloaking Online Footprints

How Tor and Its Alternatives Work

The Tor network routes internet traffic through a relay-based system, encrypting data at multiple layers and bouncing it through a sequence of volunteer-operated nodes worldwide. This design prevents websites, surveillance programs, or ISPs from knowing a user's location or browsing habits. Onion routing ensures that each relay knows only its immediate predecessor and successor, which severs the ability for any one node to trace a full communication path.

Alternative technologies like I2P (Invisible Internet Project) and Psiphon extend anonymity in different ways. I2P focuses on anonymous peer-to-peer communication within its own network rather than accessing the traditional internet. Psiphon combines VPN, SSH, and HTTP Proxy technologies to bypass censorship dynamically, especially effective in regions with deep content filtering.

Operational Access and Adoption Inside Iran

Accessibility to Tor and other decentralized tools in Iran has remained intermittent but persistent. According to Oracle's Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), attempts to connect to the Tor network are frequently blocked by state ISPs, particularly through the prevention of directory authority access or full IP blocks of entry nodes. Despite this, the introduction of Tor bridges — private entry points into the network — has sustained connectivity for determined users. Snowflake, a system that uses ephemeral proxies running in browsers, has particularly improved reachability in restrictive environments like Iran.

In 2023, Psiphon recorded over 25 million daily client connections globally, with a significant spike linked to Iranian access following domestic internet shutdowns. Its dynamic nature allows it to rapidly adapt to blocking events, often restoring partial access within hours.

Risks and Government Response

The Iranian government deploys both technical and legal countermeasures against anonymous networks. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) techniques allow telecom providers to detect and interfere with Tor traffic patterns. Since traditional VPNs and tunneling protocols have defined signatures, Iranian authorities maintain a sophisticated filtering system that can identify and disrupt such traffic in real-time.

Legally, users caught accessing banned tools, including Tor or Psiphon, risk sanctions. The Cyber Police (FATA) actively monitors traffic suspected to rely on obfuscated protocols. In response, anonymous networks have developed pluggable transports like obfs4, meek, and obfs3, which mask traffic signatures to resemble regular HTTPS transactions, making detection far more difficult.

Effectiveness, however, remains variable. Tech-savvy users are more likely to maintain access by constantly rotating bridge addresses and employing multilayer circumvention strategies. Yet average users face a steep entry curve, limited documentation in Persian, and a constant threat of traffic discovery.

Looking for a deeper evasion strategy? What happens when users combine Tor with other circumvention layers? The layered anonymity structure offers resilience, but also raises the stakes. When detection efficiency increases, so do the consequences.

Smart Circumvention: How Iranians Outsmart Censorship with Next-Gen Tools

Smart DNS and Shadowsocks: Shifting Traffic Away from Surveillance

Shadowsocks, a widely used open-source proxy tool, operates by disguising traffic to avoid detection through deep packet inspection. Unlike traditional VPNs, it uses encryption in a more subtle way, making its traffic harder to flag or block. Engineers initially developed it in China, but it's been rapidly adopted in Iran due to its agility in evading DPI filters. When configured with a reliable server abroad, it consistently penetrates government firewalls, especially during low-surveillance hours at night.

Smart DNS services take a different approach. They don’t encrypt data but instead reroute DNS queries through uncensored DNS resolvers. This sidesteps domain-based blocks implemented by Iranian ISPs. While less private than Shadowsocks or VPNs, they offer a faster browsing experience, which appeals to users streaming content or accessing high-bandwidth platforms.

User-Friendly Tools Gaining Traction: Lantern, Snowflake, and Outline

Shifting Demographics and Usage Patterns

Adoption patterns vary starkly by age and internet literacy. University students and tech workers in Tehran and Mashhad show the highest engagement with Shadowsocks and Outline, often maintaining personal servers overseas. Meanwhile, middle-aged users, especially in smaller cities, gravitate toward Lantern due to its low-tech interface. Snowflake sees peak usage among student activists aged 18–25, who also tend to distribute access guides through encrypted messaging apps.

This age-based segmentation reflects broader societal divides. Digital circumvention is not just a technical act—it’s become a cultural symbol of autonomy and dissent. Access isn’t uniform, but when tools stay responsive to real-world censorship shifts, users adapt quickly. Demand for these tools spikes sharply during blackout periods, especially when VPNs become ineffective.

Encrypted Communication Tools: The Digital Lifeline in Iran

Messaging Apps That Still Work: Encryption in Action

Despite an aggressive crackdown on digital tools, Iranians continue to rely on end-to-end encrypted messaging apps to avoid surveillance and censorship. Signal, with its strong cryptographic design using the Signal Protocol, remains one of the most trusted platforms. After its removal from local app stores and play marketplaces, users now sideload the app via APKs or access it through VPNs that work intermittently.

Sideloading remains a widespread solution. Users either share APKs via Bluetooth and offline transfers or download them through offshore servers using tunneling protocols. Telegram, although partially blocked, retains a presence through forked versions and the use of proxies. However, Telegram's E2EE (end-to-end encryption) is only available in "secret chat" mode, limiting its reliability for sensitive communications.

Signal: Encrypted, Decentralized, and Persistent

Signal gained popularity following the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests. With automatic disappearing messages, open-source code, and default E2EE for all messages and calls, it quickly became the communication tool of choice for activists, journalists, and everyday citizens. The app uses the Signal Protocol, which combines the Double Ratchet Algorithm, prekeys, and X3DH to ensure forward and backward secrecy.

Surveillance vs. Encryption: The Constant Digital Arms Race

The Iranian government continues investing in advanced surveillance technologies, including deep packet inspection and artificial intelligence monitoring systems. However, even sophisticated interception tools fail to decrypt content secured with proven E2EE methods.

The challenge for authorities isn’t just bypassing encryption—it’s locating and identifying which encrypted apps individuals use. Techniques like traffic fingerprinting and metadata analysis offer partial insight, but without access to decrypted content, most of the communication remains secure. Government-aligned hackers and cyber units attempt phishing attacks to gain device-level access, often masquerading as popular apps to trick targets into installing malicious software.

In this escalating contest between censorship and encryption, users adapt faster. They regularly rotate apps, share operational security (OpSec) guides, and form digital collectives to educate others. It’s not just a matter of privacy; in many cases, secure communication defines the boundary between safety and exposure.

Mobile Internet in Iran: Accessibility and Throttling

Major Mobile Operators and Their Roles

Three main mobile operators dominate the Iranian market: Hamrah-e Aval (MCI), Irancell, and Rightel. Hamrah-e Aval holds the largest market share, followed closely by Irancell. Rightel, the newest entrant, targets niche users with data-heavy plans. All three provide 3G and 4G services, though coverage consistency varies widely across regions.

As of 2023, over 75 million mobile broadband subscriptions exist in Iran, based on data from the Statistical Center of Iran. However, this number masks disparities in infrastructure quality, urban privilege, and restricted online freedoms.

Connectivity Gaps Between Urban and Rural Regions

In metropolitan centers like Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz, 4G coverage spans most neighborhoods. In contrast, many rural and border provinces operate with limited 3G access or suffer from total mobile internet outages. Provinces such as Sistan and Baluchestan often fall behind in connectivity readiness due to recurring political unrest and underinvestment in infrastructure.

For example, the Communication Regulatory Authority’s 2022 report showed that while over 90% of urban districts had stable mobile internet access, only 64% of rural regions reported functional high-speed service.

Protest Movements and Network Disruptions

Each protest wave maps closely to strategic mobile network throttling. Authorities have consistently disrupted service in areas experiencing mass civil unrest. During the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022, mobile internet speeds drastically dropped in several provinces, with recorded download speeds sinking below 0.5 Mbps at peak disruption times, tracked by NetBlocks real-time data observatories.

Rather than blanket shutdowns, throttling now operates with surgical precision. Specific regions, times of day, or types of traffic—especially encrypted traffic—are selectively targeted. Messaging apps like WhatsApp and Signal become unusable on mobile data while continuing to work intermittently over fixed-line broadband.

Citizens have adapted through SIM card rotation, shared VPN configurations, or switching between operators to regain access. Despite these workarounds, state infrastructure enables centralized intervention across all providers, making long-term reliability fragile.

Ever tried switching SIM cards after noticing a sudden drop in speed? That’s part of the daily norm for millions navigating Iran’s controlled mobile internet environment. It’s not just about staying connected—it’s also a strategy of digital resilience and survival.

Satellite Internet Options: Hope from Above

Starlink’s Promises and the Buzz in Iran

In late 2022, public statements by Elon Musk stirred global attention when he offered satellite internet access to Iranians through Starlink. Following the U.S. Treasury’s authorization under General License D-2, which permitted tech companies to provide internet-related services despite sanctions, SpaceX declared its intent to activate Starlink over Iranian airspace.

By Q4 2022, reports emerged suggesting the existence of a small number of activated Starlink terminals smuggled into Iran. These accounts, largely anecdotal and often shared through encrypted messaging platforms or the diaspora network, indicated successful connections in isolated cases. However, no large-scale deployment has been verified, and sources within Iran have not confirmed sustained coverage or mass availability of terminals.

Tehran’s Defensive Responses

The Iranian government treats foreign satellite internet as a national security threat. Officials have publicly condemned Starlink, labeling it a breach of sovereignty. In reaction to emerging satellite connections, state authorities have explored jamming techniques aimed at disrupting satellite frequencies.

Radio frequency jamming, similar to methods used during past foreign media blackouts, targets the uplink and downlink bands used by Low Earth Orbit satellites. Additionally, laws enacted in recent years criminalize the import, sale, or use of unauthorized communication equipment, including satellite receivers. Confiscation, imprisonment, and other penalties serve as common enforcement tools.

Engineering the Connection: Not Plug-and-Play

Technical access to Starlink in Iran is theoretically feasible but practically complex. Since satellite terminals require a clear view of the sky and access to power, users must carefully conceal installations from detection. Moreover, Starlink installation kits are bulky and expensive — prices for standard terminals reach upwards of $599, not including shipping and service subscription fees, which stand at around $110/month for residential use as of 2025 .

Latency and packet loss fluctuate based on geographical location, user density per satellite, and obstruction levels. In tests across restricted regions, uploads and downloads approached 100 Mbps under optimal conditions. However, this speed drops sharply with interference, partial obstruction, or poor atmospheric conditions.

Legal Dimensions of an Illicit Signal

Despite U.S. legal clearance, international treaties governing satellite broadcasts complicate the matter. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) requires coordination with the host nation for official signal acceptance. Iran has not entered such an agreement with SpaceX or similar providers. This places Starlink operations in Iran in an extra-legal, unofficial gray zone.

Meanwhile, the geopolitical ramifications remain unresolved. Offering unauthorized internet in a sovereign country collides with norms of non-intervention. Consequently, even if access is technically enabled, widespread deployment relies heavily on enforcement tolerance, logistics, and continued support from diaspora networks.

So while satellites point the way forward, the gap between technical capability and practical access in Iran remains wide — and for now, only a handful manage to cross it.

The Future of Connectivity in Iran: Between Control and Innovation

The digital terrain within Iran stands at a crossroads. On one side, the state reinforces its grip through tight control mechanisms and legislative barriers. On the other, technological advancements and global digital solidarity continue to puncture that control—if not consistently, then persistently.

Predicting the Unpredictable: Policy vs. Progress

Connectivity in Iran doesn’t follow a linear pattern. It reacts. Political turbulence, like protests or elections, triggers shutdowns and throttling. At the same time, resourceful developers and diaspora technologists push patches, encryption updates, and novel protocols into circulation—sometimes from day one. If upcoming elections result in a policy shift, system-level censorship could either tighten or yield slightly under public and international pressure. But without structural changes in political will, substantial and stable digital openness remains improbable.

External Pressures, Internal Resistance

International bodies, from the UN to the EU, continue urging Iran to uphold internet freedom. Yet diplomatic statements rarely translate to connectivity on the ground. What makes an impact? Coordinated circumvention tool deployment, real-time technical support, and campaign pressure from human rights organizations. These actions create friction for control and introduce a threat-reward calculation that authorities must confront.

The Resilience Equation

Iranian users consistently demonstrate adaptive intelligence. They pivot fast—from Psiphon to Outline VPNs, from WhatsApp to Briar, from servers in Europe to mesh networks in their neighborhoods. Their digital resilience isn’t theoretical—it’s practiced, daily. They pass tools down to younger siblings, train parents, and warn others when backdoors are found. Restriction fuels innovation here, not silence.

Looking Ahead

Instead of absolute predictions, focus on trendlines. Wherever there’s suppression, there has also been IP reassignment, deepfake camouflage, and secure tunnel orchestration by amateurs turned experts. The future of connectivity in Iran won’t emerge from a single keystroke. It will grow in the fault lines between law and code, power and people, silence and signal.