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The Pentagon Can't Trust GPS

Global Positioning System (GPS) technology underpins everything from smartphone directions and financial transactions to precision-guided munitions and troop movements. Originally developed by the U.S. Department of Defense, GPS has become indispensable across military and civilian sectors. Yet despite this foundational role, the Pentagon is increasingly questioning GPS's reliability in contested environments.

This growing mistrust stems from vulnerabilities in signal integrity, risk of jamming or spoofing, and the rapid pace of adversarial advancements in electronic warfare. At stake is far more than navigation accuracy—national security tactics, critical infrastructure timing, and entire logistical operations depend on trustworthy geolocation data. As military planners confront emerging threats, the question intensifies: what happens when GPS can’t be trusted?

The Fragility of GPS: How Dependence Creates Exposure

Heavy Reliance Across the Globe—None More Than the U.S.

Almost every modern military system—from smart bombs to troop movements—anchors its operations to the Global Positioning System. Civilian infrastructure follows close behind: aviation, maritime logistics, emergency response, and financial transactions all synchronize through GPS signals. The U.S., architect and primary steward of GPS, leans into it more heavily than any other nation. That reliance, while enabling unmatched accuracy and coordination, also introduces an exploitable weakness.

Disruption by Design: How GPS Spoofing Works

Spoofing introduces counterfeit GPS signals that mimic legitimate ones, deceiving receivers into miscalculating their true position or time. These fabricated transmissions, when engineered with precision, can hijack autonomous systems, redirect drones, or feed pilots navigational lies. The process exploits the fact that civilian-grade GPS lacks authentication mechanisms. Even military-grade systems, while encrypted, are not invulnerable to sophisticated spoofing strategies when combined with jamming or cyber intrusion.

Signal Sabotage: Jamming and the Fight for Frequency

Jamming attacks drown out legitimate GPS signals with noise, effectively making it impossible for receivers to decode position, velocity, or timing data. Because GPS satellites transmit weak signals from orbit—typically around -130 to -125 dBm by the time they reach Earth—they are easy targets for interference even with low-power jammers. A handheld jamming device emitting just a few watts can block GPS signals over several kilometers. Military operations conducted in contested territories frequently encounter this problem, sometimes compromising mission effectiveness in real time.

When Theory Meets the Battlefield: Exercises That Simulate the Fallout

The U.S. military has staged numerous training scenarios that deliberately involve GPS denial to test operational resilience. One such example: the Army's Project Convergence 2021 in Yuma, Arizona and White Sands Missile Range. During these exercises, units operated in a degraded GPS environment to evaluate alternative navigation methods and autonomous system behaviors. NATO exercises like Trident Juncture have also included deliberate jamming, both to assess impact and test electromagnetic resilience.

But real-world encounters go beyond simulations. In 2018, NATO forces in Norway experienced GPS disruptions traced back to Russian activity during joint military drills. Civilian flights near the eastern Mediterranean have also reported interruptions, with spoofed locations regularly redirecting aircraft navigation systems over Lebanese airspace. These incidents confirm the practical vulnerability of GPS-dependent systems in active geopolitical environments.

Breaking the GPS Habit: Inside the Pentagon’s Strategic Shift

Beyond Satellites: A Multi-Layered Navigation Strategy

The Department of Defense no longer views GPS as a singular navigation solution. Years of analysis, exercises, and contested environment simulations have shown how vulnerable satellite signals are to interference, jamming, and spoofing. In response, the Pentagon has begun pivoting to what it calls “assured PNT” (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing)—an approach based on redundancy, diversification, and resilience across platforms.

This doesn’t just mean adding a backup system. It means restructuring how the military thinks about space-based services entirely. The shift involves integrated systems that combine inertial navigation units (INUs), magnetic field mapping, vision-aided navigation, and terrain-relative navigation into next-gen warfighter tools. This enables forces to operate with or without GPS signals in real time, in any domain—air, sea, land, or space.

Budget Refocus: How Funding is Driving Innovation

Spending patterns underscore this doctrinal transformation. In FY2023, the DoD allocated over $400 million to programs under the Navigation Warfare (NavWar) umbrella. These programs aim to fortify positioning systems with anti-jam and anti-spoof capabilities. The FY2024 budget request added another $275 million for “assured PNT” initiatives specifically designed to develop GPS alternatives that function in contested environments.

Future years will see even more reshaping. The DoD's 2024–2028 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) earmarks allocations for integrated PNT fusion systems on aircraft, unmanned systems, and mobile ground units. These budget lines are not temporary boosts—they’re baked into long-term acquisition strategies, which means one thing: GPS supremacy is no longer the assumption.

DARPA and the Disruption of Navigation Norms

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) leads many of these next-gen navigation experiments. Under its “MOIRE” (Magneto-Optical Inertial Reference Ensemble) and “All Source Positioning and Navigation (ASPN)” projects, DARPA is prototyping systems that use local sensors, object recognition, and sensor fusion for real-time geolocation, regardless of satellite availability.

These projects have already moved into operational testing phases. In 2022, DARPA demonstrated the viability of fully GPS-independent navigation in aircraft flying over GPS-jammed test zones in Nevada and Alaska. The results were clear: by leveraging sensor fusion and AI-led verification, forces maintained meter-level accuracy without a single satellite lock.

The next step is scale. Transition teams are working to integrate DARPA tech into standard Department of the Navy, Air Force, and Army procurement pipelines. That job falls on offices like the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center and Army PNT Cross-Functional Team (CFT), which are operationalizing this shift at speed.

Satellite Vulnerabilities: A Target in the Sky

Cyberattacks: Weaponizing Code Against Space Assets

GPS satellites rely on complex onboard systems and constant communication with ground control networks. This link creates a digital attack surface that adversaries actively exploit. Cyber operations targeting satellites can override control mechanisms, interfere with signal integrity, or corrupt time synchronization feeds. Once compromised, a GPS satellite may transmit inaccurate data without immediate detection, triggering ripple effects through military operations, missile guidance, and communications infrastructure.

Both nation-states and independent threat actors have demonstrated capacity for these types of intrusions. In 2018, a cybersecurity research group at Symantec reported that satellite communications systems used by U.S. defense contractors were probed and potentially breached by suspected Chinese military cyber units. This type of threat exposure compromises not just the satellite itself but entire battlefield strategies reliant on real-time geospatial intelligence.

Direct Kinetic Threats: Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons

Orbital objects are not protected by distance; they remain well within the range of modern missile systems. ASAT weapons, capable of physically destroying satellites, have transitioned from conceptual deterrents to demonstrable capabilities. China launched a direct-ascent ASAT missile in 2007, striking one of its own defunct weather satellites at approximately 865 km altitude. The test created more than 3,000 trackable pieces of debris, showcasing precision and willingness.

Russia and India have since entered the arena with their own successful ASAT demonstrations. The U.S., once a silent holder of this capability, acknowledged its kinetic potential with the 2008 Operation Burnt Frost. This operational maturity means hostile actors can target GPS satellites intentionally, not merely jam their signals on the ground.

Space-Based EMP Attacks: Disrupting from Orbit

Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats from space are no longer theoretical. When delivered at high altitudes, EMP weapons can instantly degrade or destroy satellite electronics. A brief pulse can overload circuitry, scramble memory, expose sensitive components to radiation, and force permanent shutdowns. Unlike kinetic strikes, EMP attacks require no physical contact and leave no readily attributable signature.

Military analysts assess that advanced adversaries are researching low-yield, high-impact nuclear detonations in space as a viable strategy to paralyze communications and navigation constellations. Because GPS satellites were not initially configured to harden against such threats, this form of space-based disruption remains a high-impact scenario under consideration by U.S. Strategic Command.

Geopolitical Rivals in Orbit: A New Theater of Hostilities

The strategic domain of outer space has experienced a complete doctrinal shift. Where Cold War-era dominance revolved around nuclear arsenals and ICBMs, 21st-century positioning privileges are now projected through satellite constellations. China's BeiDou system and Russia's GLONASS offer full-spectrum alternatives to GPS and underscore the ambition to operate independently of U.S. infrastructures.

More pointedly, these geopolitical rivals are developing counterspace capabilities designed to erode GPS exclusivity. In 2020, the U.S. Space Force confirmed that Russian satellites demonstrated dangerously close maneuvering to U.S. government space assets — a practice known as ‘Rendezvous and Proximity Operations’ (RPO). These moves serve intelligence collection as well as potential attack trajectories. Surveillance, jamming, spoofing, and kinetic disruption are all executable from low Earth orbit with advancing technology.

Satellites, once perceived as untouchable infrastructure serving from a distance, now operate in contested space. The Pentagon’s reliance on GPS in such an environment mirrors the risk of building a fortress with glass walls—not susceptible due to a lack of vision, but from underestimating its exposure.

Mounting Warnings: The Dangers of a GPS-Only Strategy

Voices from Oversight: What the GAO Uncovered

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has delivered repeated assessments that challenge the Department of Defense’s reliance on GPS as a single point of failure. In a 2022 report, the GAO highlighted that DoD programs had consistently failed to integrate GPS alternatives despite long-standing directives to reduce dependence. Among its findings: half of the GPS modernization programs reviewed did not have backup navigation capabilities planned or integrated. The GAO labeled this trend as a "high-risk area" and recommended an urgent reevaluation of architecture dependencies.

Beyond system design, the GAO called attention to budgetary inertia. Funding slanted disproportionately toward GPS enhancements, while non-GPS positioning projects remained unsupported or underdeveloped — a pattern the GAO flagged as "strategically misaligned with operational realities."

RAND Corporation: Modeling the Future Without Bounded Assumptions

Independent analysis from the RAND Corporation added depth to the discussion. Their 2021 report, commissioned by the Air Force, ran advanced scenario simulations exposing cascading failure risks. In one modeled scenario, GPS disruption over a three-hour period during a coordinated Pacific theater operation led to a 43% degradation in command-and-control effectiveness. This included delayed strike timing, failed drone synchronizations, and compromised troop positioning.

RAND also examined civilian-military intersections. Disruptions in GPS infected not only military precision but also logistics, emergency response, and transportation infrastructure. According to RAND models, a 24-hour nationwide GPS outage would result in economic losses exceeding $1 billion — with military consequences compounding every hour.

Pentagon Internal Reviews: Gaps Between Doctrine and Reality

Internal audits within the Pentagon mirror external concerns. A 2023 Inspector General report criticized multiple commands for over-reliance on GPS despite battle planning that assumed degraded GPS environments. Units across three service branches failed simulation tests that removed GPS access for just 90 minutes. During these exercises, navigation errors compounded with firing inaccuracies and increased mission abort rates, creating conditions one commander described as "operational paralysis."

Despite adoption of GPS-jamming countermeasures in theory, practical readiness remained low. The audit concluded with a stark statement: "The current configuration of U.S. forces cannot assure effectiveness under active GPS compromise. The adversary knows this. We continue to behave as if we do not."

Cascading Effects: From Defense Grid to City Streets

GPS serves as more than a navigational tool. It synchronizes data centers, cell towers, financial transactions, power grids, and aircraft routes. When GPS fails, the ripple hits everything. Defense operations rely on GPS for encrypted comms timing, Blue Force Tracking, and missile guidance, while civilian infrastructure uses it to manage road traffic signals, drone delivery routes, and search-and-rescue coordination.

Each of these examples underscores a central truth: the American Republic currently builds both defense and daily routine on a thin strand of radio signals 12,550 miles above Earth — a strand every peer adversary is actively testing for weakness.

The Business of Navigation: A Critical Asset

Commercial Markets Anchored to a Vulnerable System

When the Department of Defense questions GPS reliability, commercial stakeholders feel the tremor. Navigation forms the bedrock of modern logistics, precision agriculture, delivery routing, autonomous vehicles, and location-based services. If the Pentagon can’t trust GPS, neither can the companies whose bottom lines depend on it.

Defense contractors like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon sit at the nexus of this concern. Each has multi-billion-dollar programs tied to GPS technology. From airborne communications systems to missile guidance packages, their systems are calibrated around satellite-based location data.

But the echo of vulnerability doesn’t stop at military-grade equipment.

Tech Giants and Everyday Systems: Shared Exposure

Logistics companies like FedEx or UPS rely on GPS to optimize route planning, reduce fuel consumption, and meet razor-thin delivery windows. Ride-sharing apps, food delivery platforms, e-scooter networks, mapping services, emergency response systems—each traces its operational agility directly to global positioning signals.

A 2021 report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimated that GPS outages could cost the U.S. economy $1 billion per day, with transportation and logistics absorbing the biggest financial hit. This figure underscores the scale of commercial exposure.

Reassurance for Sale: Hardware, Software, Countermeasures

In response to eroding confidence in GPS resilience, companies have built a business out of reassurance. They market retrofittable solutions and hybrid systems that integrate inertial navigation units, terrestrial radio signals, and encrypted timing—each one promising independence or at least resistance to signal loss or spoofing.

Software firms, too, have seized opportunity in vulnerability. AI-based analytics now monitor for GPS anomalies in real time. Anomalous deviation detection is marketed as a service—flagging spoofing attempts, calibrating positioning errors, and triggering failsafe protocols.

Why the Pentagon’s Doubt Becomes Everyone’s Problem

When an institution with the Pentagon’s visibility and stake in global stability questions GPS, insurers get involved, compliance teams reevaluate, and investor confidence wavers. Commercial navigation is no longer just a matter of convenience—it's now tightly conjoined with national security perceptions.

Those who provide tools to mitigate threats find new markets opening. For everyone else, the race to diversify navigation architecture is no longer optional—it’s a boardroom priority.

Shaping the Future: Alternative Positioning Technologies the Pentagon Is Exploring

The Pentagon no longer places unqualified trust in GPS. As adversaries display increasing sophistication in GPS jamming, spoofing, and space-based assaults, the Department of Defense has expanded its investment in alternative navigation systems. These technologies are already being integrated into next-generation military platforms, promising a more resilient framework for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).

Inertial Navigation Systems (INS): Autonomous and Unjammable

Inertial Navigation Systems operate independently of external signals, relying instead on accelerometers and gyroscopes to calculate position, orientation, and velocity. While susceptible to drift over time, modern INS units—especially those integrated with GPS when available—can sustain reliable short- to medium-term accuracy. Military aircraft, submarines, and ballistic missile systems already use INS effectively.

In 2021, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) continued funding the Precise Robust Inertial Guidance for Munitions (PRIGM) initiative. The aim: develop miniaturized INS units for precision-guided munitions that don’t rely on satellite signals. Expect these devices to populate more hardware as their size decreases and processor speeds increase.

Ground-Based Radio Navigation: eLORAN Returns

LORAN (Long Range Navigation), once abandoned, now returns to relevance in the form of eLORAN. With low-frequency, high-power terrestrial transmitters, eLORAN signals cover broader geographic areas and are exceptionally resistant to jamming. Accuracy for eLORAN typically falls within 8 to 20 meters—enough for naval and logistical applications where sub-meter precision is not required.

The U.S. Department of Transportation issued a request in 2020 seeking proposals for nationwide eLORAN deployment as a GPS backup. Defense contractors like Harris Corporation and UrsaNav have already demonstrated transportable eLORAN infrastructure for rapid deployment in conflict zones. These systems enable hardened navigation layers that function even in GPS-denied environments.

Quantum Navigation: Early but Promising

Quantum navigation measures an object’s movement using properties of quantum mechanics—specifically, quantum interferometry. This allows navigation without signals from satellites, radio beacons, or inertial drift correction. Development is ongoing, yet projects under DARPA and the U.K. Ministry of Defence indicate growing investment.

In 2022, research teams at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory achieved successful lab-scale quantum accelerometer tests with military-grade sensitivity. While operational deployment remains years away, integration with other sensor suites could position quantum navigation as the core of future autonomous systems.

Systems Integration: From Prototypes to Combat Vehicles

Alternative navigation becomes functional only when embedded within platforms. The U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) has fused INS, celestial navigation modules, and magnetometers into prototype navigation pods for Stryker vehicles and unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Multi-sensor fusion—pulling data from multiple sources—reduces dependence on any single navigational method.

What emerges is not a single replacement but an interoperable ecosystem. By combining hardened old technologies with emerging quantum and sensor-based innovations, the Pentagon builds layered resilience into its navigation strategy—without waiting for new satellites to go online.

Cybersecurity in Defense Systems: GPS Under Digital Siege

The Pentagon’s reliance on Global Positioning System technology opens more than just satellite vulnerabilities—it dramatically enlarges the digital attack surface across military networks. Every base transmission, vehicle coordination, or precision weapons system operating on GPS becomes an access point for cyber intrusion. Unlike physical attacks on satellites, these cyber threats operate silently, probing for weak encryption and flawed security protocols at all levels of GPS infrastructure.

Spoofing Through the Back Door

Injecting misinformation into navigation systems doesn’t require a missile—it only takes a well-engineered spoof. Cybercriminals and state-sponsored hackers leverage software vulnerabilities in GPS receivers or associated networks to transmit false signals. This manipulation, known as GPS spoofing, can redirect a drone, mislead a submarine, or scramble troop logistics without firing a shot. In 2019, cybersecurity firm Trend Micro demonstrated how spoofing attacks could be executed via vulnerabilities in GPS-based time synchronization systems, affecting even non-military networks.

Once a spoofed signal is accepted as legitimate, the receiving system executes as commanded—no alarms, no alerts, just quiet deviation. These threats slip past traditional defenses because they originate not from explosive payloads, but from deceptive code infiltrating devices from within the military's own digital environment.

Where Cyber Warfare and Traditional Threats Collide

The convergence of cyber warfare and satellite vulnerability creates a dynamic threat landscape in which old-school dominance no longer guarantees control. Signal jamming, once considered a standalone risk, now works in tandem with spoofing and network-based intrusions to degrade, disrupt, or fully neutralize GPS operations. For example, if an adversary first jams a GPS signal to create confusion, that disruption can serve as cover for a simultaneous cyberattack on ground-based systems trying to recalibrate or reroute.

At the intersection of kinetic and digital hostility lies a new battlefield—one where the hacker’s keyboard and the missile operator's launchpad target the same objective: navigation dominance. U.S. defense systems integrate GPS data through software-defined platforms, and this digital integration, while operationally efficient, amplifies systemic exposure to cyberattack vectors.

Digital Dependency Has Consequences

Each weakness compounds the next. Cybersecurity breaches do not just trigger logistical delays—they may introduce life-and-death discrepancies in battlefield intelligence, target acquisition, and command execution.

So ask this: when warfighters follow GPS-guided coordinates on the next mission, whose signal are they really reading?

Jamming the Signal: Electronic Warfare and the End of GPS Certainty

GPS Denial as a Battlefield Strategy

Electronic warfare (EW) has altered the landscape of modern combat. Since GPS signals are weak and unencrypted in many defense applications, they offer a low-cost, high-impact target. Jamming, spoofing, and localized electromagnetic interference now feature as standard elements in hostile military playbooks.

On modern battlefields, GPS denial serves one clear purpose: degrade enemy situational awareness, suppress precision targeting, and cause disorientation in both troops and weapons systems. These tactics slow down decision-making, muddle navigation, and severely limit the deployment of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) assets and precision-guided munitions. No satellite signal? No smart weapon.

Russian and Chinese Capabilities in Electronic Warfare

Russia and China have strategically invested in mobile, flexible EW assets designed to neutralize or distort satellite-based guidance systems. Russian systems like Krasukha-4 and R-330Zh Zhitel can jam GPS, satellite communications, and airborne early warning signals within a radius of up to 300 kilometers. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China has developed comparable capabilities, including truck-mounted and airborne jammers that target the U.S. military's reliance on space-based tools (CSIS analysis, 2023).

In peacetime exercises and wartime operations alike, these systems are now a standard component of the Russian and Chinese order of battle. Their strategy prioritizes electromagnetic dominance in the first 48 hours of a conflict.

On-the-Ground Lessons from Ukraine and Syria

Field reports from the Ukrainian front and from U.S. operations in Syria provide case studies in real-time GPS denial. Russian EW units have been used extensively in eastern Ukraine, disrupting UAV operations, redirecting munitions, and destabilizing command-and-control communications. The Ukrainian military has documented numerous cases of GPS spoofing against both drone platforms and ground troops — vehicles show altered positions on GPS devices, forcing manual corrections that expose troop locations to enemy fire.

In Syria, U.S. Special Operations forces reported significant GPS interference starting in 2018. Drones flying over certain sectors near Russian-controlled zones deviated from their planned flight paths due to manipulated coordinates. Investigations traced these effects to Russian-origin jammers operating nearby. Despite American electronic countermeasures, these devices frequently succeeded in degrading navigation and ISR collection capabilities.

U.S. Military Training for a GPS-Denied Future

Reacting to consistent threats, the Pentagon has begun reshaping its doctrine and readiness for environments without satellite support. Joint training exercises now incorporate deliberate GPS jamming as part of the scenario structure. Units rehearse maneuvering with inertial navigation, visual cues, and terrestrial radar mapping.

Instructors remove digital crutches during exercises, forcing units to adapt with the tools available. This shift reflects a broader evolution of military strategy: move fast, act decentralized, and navigate without depending on the clearest signal from space.

Military Navigation Systems: Beyond GPS

Developing Resilience Through Redundancy

Modern military navigation systems integrate layered redundancy frameworks to ensure consistent operability even during GPS outages. These frameworks combine inertial navigation systems (INS), terrain contour matching (TERCOM), visual navigation sensors, and radio-frequency-based systems such as LORAN-C. By design, redundancy avoids single points of failure—when one system is compromised, others take over seamlessly without mission interruption.

Inertia-based systems, particularly ring laser gyroscopes and fiber optic gyroscopes, play a pivotal role here. While GPS provides absolute accuracy over long ranges, INS delivers uninterrupted relative positioning. Missile guidance systems, aircraft, and naval platforms all rely heavily on this hybrid model.

Beyond the U.S. GPS: Accessing Diverse Satellite Constellations

The Department of Defense no longer relies solely on the United States’ Navstar GPS constellation. Strategic alignment now includes compatibility with alternative global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), such as:

These multi-GNSS receivers create a fortified architecture. Devices can triangulate from more satellites, reject faulty signals, and maintain navigation integrity even in contested environments.

Engineering Innovation Driven by Diverse Talent

Behind the complex evolution of GPS-alternative systems stands a rising cohort of engineers who shape the future of secure navigation. Women engineers, in particular, are redefining conventional approaches. At institutions like MIT Lincoln Laboratory, women-led teams have authored breakthroughs in quantum accelerometry—devices requiring no satellite input yet delivering precise inertial location over extended missions.

In DARPA’s PNT Progeny initiative, female-led research groups pioneered real-time signal spoofing detection methods by fusing environmental data with AI-driven pattern analysis. Their work now feeds into wearable battlefield devices, drone swarm protocols, and autonomous vehicle navigation stacks.

Curious how these systems maintain accuracy under fire? Or how AI integrates with inertial guidance? Dive deeper into the technical layers driving the Pentagon’s next-generation battlefield assumptions.

The New Map: Navigating Without a Single Compass

The Pentagon doesn't mistrust GPS out of paranoia. This doubt stems from operational experience, technical assessments, and credible threats. Interference, jamming, spoofing—these aren't hypotheticals. They're frequent and increasingly sophisticated tactics deployed by adversaries who understand the United States' reliance on satellite signals.

By treating GPS as one input among many, rather than the sole source of navigation truth, the Department of Defense shifts from a brittle dependency to a flexible, multi-layered strategy. This reset in mindset acknowledges that redundancy isn't an inefficiency—it’s an asset in combat scenarios where digital certainty doesn't exist.

Diversification doesn't only mean new tech. It means an integrated system: terrestrial signals, inertial sensors, magnetic field mapping, visual terrain recognition, encrypted time-stamped signals, all working in synchronicity. In this environment, if one node fails or is attacked, the others uphold the network. Tactical resilience replaces blind trust.

Look at the greater map—technology companies, defense contractors, startups in positioning analytics, students building autonomous navigation systems. Every actor plays a role in reshaping how America positions its forces. And policymakers define the terrain: funding priorities, procurement timelines, regulatory clarity, and intellectual property safeguards for DoD-civilian collaborations.

The next leap won’t come from retrofitting GPS, but from embracing diversified strategies tailored for contested domains. That’s where the innovation lies. That’s what will keep military systems accurate, responsive, and secure.